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THE SOUTH CAROLINA UNAUTHORIZED
INSURERS ACT-PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES
In recent years there has been a tremendous growth in the
business of "mail order" insurance. Many insurance companies
maintain an office and own property only in the state where they
are incorporated but offer insurance throughout the nation.
Frequently they have no agents and new business is secured
solely by advertisement and solicitation by mail.1 Normally the
amount of policy coverage sold by them is small. After a loss
occurs, such an insurer frequently offers the insured an inade-
quate settlement on a take it or leave it basis. Sometimes the
insurer may deny coverage altogether.2 Without protective legis-
lation, the insured is given no choice but to accept the insurer's
offer, if any, or to sue the insurer in its home state. The insurer
will in most cases have its own way, particularly if the amount
involved is small.8
The Uniform Unauthorized Insurers Act was approved by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, and the American Bar Association in 1938. South Caro-
lina adopted the act in substance in 19435 and enacted an amend-
ed version into its Insurance Code in 19471.6 The act was de-
signed to combat the deceptive practices of such "mail order"
businesses.
Six years after the proposal of the Uniform Act, the Supreme
Court held that insurance practices fell under the commerce
clause and were therefore subject to federal regulation.7 Con-
gress almost immediately passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act8
in which the regulation of insurers was left to the states. To
prevent federal control, however, the states' regulation must be
effective.9
1. Ross v. American Income Life Ins. Co., 232 S.C. 433, 102 S.E.2d 743
(1958); see Dean, The Foreign Unauthorized Insurer: A State Regulatory
Gap, July 1965 INS. COUNSEL J. 432.
2. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
3. Storey v. United Ins. Co., 64 F. Supp. 896 (E.D.S.C. 1946).
4. Historical Note, Uniform Unauthorized Insurers Act, 9C U.L.A. 303.
5. S.C. AcTs & J. REs. 1943, p. 210.
6. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-261 to -272 (1962).
7. United States v. South Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
8. 59 Stat. 33, 34 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1959).
9. FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293 (1960) held that, with
regard to the unauthorized insurer, the states in which the insurer operates are
required to maintain effective regulation. See text accompanying notes 77, 78,
infra.
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Because of the need, and also through the impetus of the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act, all fifty states have adopted the Uniform
Act or similar statutes.10
I. GFNMUi PROVISIONS
The first four sections of the South Carolina act prohibit any
person from aiding or acting as an agent for an unauthorized
insurer in this state.
11
Section 5 contains the crucial provisions of the act. This pro-
vides that the issuance and delivery of an insurance policy by
an unauthorized insurer to any person in this state, or the col-
lection of a premium from such a person, will constitute the
Commissioner of Insurance the lawful attorney upon whom
service of process may be made in any actions in behalf of the
insured arising out of the policy.
12
Section 6 states that no unauthorized insurer can institute suit
arising out of the transaction of the insurance business in South
Carolina until it procures a license to do business in this state.13
Section 7 prohibits an unauthorized insurer from filing any
pleading in any action instituted against it before posting a bond
in an amount fixed by the court sufficient to satisfy any final
judgment or procuring a certificate of authority to do business
in this state.1
4
Section 8 provides that the unauthorized insurer may make a
motion, without regard to Section 7, to set aside service on the
ground 1) that no such policy has been issued, 2) that it has
not been transacting business in this state, 3) that the person




The principal objection to the unauthorized insurers acts was
their questionable constitutionality.16 Originally, in order for
10. For a collection of these statutes see ABA PROCEEDINGS 1964, SECTION
OF INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE AND COMPENSATION LAW 232-33.
II. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-261 to -264 (1962).
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-265 (1962).
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-267 (1962).
14. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-268 (1962).
15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-270 (1962).
16. Dean, supra note 1, at 439.
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 5 [1964], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol17/iss5/7
1965]
a state to acquire in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident,
the non-resident had to be served with process within the state,
or he had to make a voluntary general appearance. 17 This
restriction gradually fell away, however, and in 1945 the Su-
preme Court held that in order to subject an absentee defendant
to state jurisdiction, the due process clause requires only that he
have minimum contacts with the state so that the maintenance of
the suit does not "offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."18 This rationale was carried into the insur-
ance field in 1950.19
In 1957 the matter was settled in McGee v. International Life
Ins. 60.20 The Court upheld the service portion of California's
unauthorized insurers act where only one policy of insurance had
been issued to a resident of that state. Mr. Justice Black, speak-
ing for the Court, stated: "It is sufficient for the purposes of due
process that the suit was based on a contract which had a sub-
stantial connection with that state."21 A year later the South
Carolina statute was tested in the state supreme court. In a
similar factual context,2 2 the court, basing its decision primarily
on McGee, held the statute constitutional.
B. Construction
In order to use an unauthorized insurers act the plaintiff
must first bring himself within the terms of the act. The act,
by its nature, is limited solely to unauthorized insurers and
cannot be used as an alternative mode of service against an
authorized insurer.23 Therefore, it does not deal with questions
of venue. For example, if the insurer is licensed in the state and
has its agent in one county, the act cannot be used to allow
maintenance of the suit in another county.
24
If the insurer, for any reason, has been exempted from the
state's licensing requirements, the act would probably be con-
strued as unavailable. In New York, for example, fraternal
17. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
18. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
19. Traveler's Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
20. 355 U.S. 220 (1957); see Parmalee v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n,
206 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 877 (1953).
21. 355 U.S. at 223.
22. Ross v. American Income Life Ins. Co., 232 S.C. 433, 102 S.R.2d 743
(1958) ; see Storey v. United Ins. Co., 64 F. Supp. 896 (E.D.S.C. 1946).
23. Hodges v. Home Ins. Co., 232 N.C. 475, 61 S.E.2d 372 (1950).
24. Liberty Bell Mut Fire Ins. Co. v. Exum, 209 Ga. 548, 74 S.E2d 738
(1953).
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benefit societies are not required to obtain licenses to sell insur-
ance. One New York court ruled that, because of this, such




Once the plaintiff shows that his case is within the literal
terms of the statute he must prove that the unauthorized insurer
has sufficient contacts with the state, so that maintenance of
the suit would not exceed the jurisdictional authority of the
state.
Normally the plaintiff can easily prove that; 1) he is a resi-
dent of the state, 2) the policy was solicited in the state, 3) it
was issued and delivered to him there, and 4) he subsequently
paid his premiums from the state. Proof of these facts is un-
doubtedly sufficient to confer jurisdiction.26 If the plaintiff
can prove other sales in the state this will make the state's
authority clearer, but in most cases this is difficult and not a
necessity.27 The above facts provide a safe and concrete mini-
mum. Problems arise when there is something less.
The defendant may contest jurisdiction by directly attacking
the constitutionality of the statute. In the majority of cases,
however, the direct constitutionality is not in issue. 28 The South
Carolina act expressly allows the defendant to appear specially
to set aside service on the ground that it has not issued a policy
to a South Carolina resident or that it has not been transacting
business in this state.
29
The plaintiff always carries the burden of proving the defend-
ant's contacts. An averment by the defendant that it was not
25. Gentile v. Air Line Pilots Mut. Aid Ass'n, 40 Misc. 2d 291, 243 N.Y.S.2d
50 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1950); The plaintiff should also make sure the de-
fendant is actually an insurance company. This problem has mainly arisen in
suits against Lloyds of London which is not a company but rather an associa-
tion of individual insurers. See, e.g., Atex Mfg. Co. v. "Lloyds of London",
139 F. Supp. 314 (W.D. Ark. 1955).
26. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-265 (1962).
27. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Ross v.
American Income Life Ins. Co., 232 S.C. 433, 102 S.E.2d 743 (1958). The more
restrictive earlier cases such as Employers Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Lejeune, 189
F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1951) and White v. Indiana Travelers Assur. Co., 22 So.
2d 137 (La. App. 1945) have been superseded by McGee, supra.
28. The plaintiff can at times aid his case where normally insufficient con-
tacts would exist by proving additional factors, for example, that there was an
agent in the state. See Naso v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 156 F. Supp.
611 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
29. See, e.g., Storey v. United Ins. Co., 64 F. Supp. 896 (E.D.S.C. 1946).
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doing business in the state has been held to establish a prima
facie case that the plaintiff's service upon the superintendent of
insurance gave no jurisdiction over the company. 0
The courts have resolved the question of jurisdiction on the
basis of general fairness.3 1 If the insurer solicits contracts in
the state and no one purchases, it has done nothing to bind itself
to the state. Likewise, if a policy is sold in the state without its
knowledge it should not be held liable there.32 Once solicitation
in the state results in the purchase of a policy by a resident, the
insurer, through its own initiative, has established a continuing
relationship with the state and it is fair to allow a suit by the
insured there. In such a context a state has been held to have
jurisdiction even though the insured property was located in an-
other state,3 3 and the fact that the insured personally purchased
his policy at the insurer's office in another state has been held not
to defeat jurisdiction.84
The character of the residence of the purchaser should make
no difference for jurisdictional purposes as long as he will be
in the state a sufficient time that the insurer could reasonably
expect that a loss might possibly occur there.35
D. PecuZiar Problems
The South Carolina act states that the issuance and delivery
of a policy to any person in this state or the collection of a pre-
mium from such a person is sufficient to confer jurisdiction.36
This involves a nebulous and intricate constitutional area and,
regardless of the language used, it would seem that the statute
cannot constitutionally be applied to an insurance company
which does not have certain minimum contacts with the state.
The act, as passed in 1943, required as a prerequisite for juris-
diction that the unauthorized insurer issue or deliver an insur-
30. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-270 (1962).
31. Weinstein v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 206 Misc. 128, 134 N.Y.S.2d 207
(Sup. Ct. 1954).
32. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
33. See Wash v. Western Empire Life Ins. Co., 298 F.2d 374 (8th Cir. 1962).
34. Zacharakis v. Bunker Hill Mut. Ins. Co., 281 App. Div. 487, 120 N.Y.S.
2d 418 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
35. Groff v. Automobile Owners Safety Ins. Co., 180 Kan. 518, 306 P.2d 130
(1957).
36. This question has arisen with regard to servicemen who are normally
only temporary residents where stationed. The better reasoning is to allow
suits by them. See Polglase v. Illinois Nat'l Ins. Co., 183 F. Supp. 519 (N.D.
Cal. 1960) ; Vehrs v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 168 So. 2d 875 (La. App. 1964) ; but
see Johnson v. Universal Underwriters, Inc., 283 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1960).
1965]
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ance policy to a resident of this state.87 In Sanders v. CoZumbian
Protective Ass'n,38 the court was faced with a case in which the
insured, domiciled in New York, purchased a policy there
from a New York insurer and subsequently resided in South
Carolina. He died in Belgium. While the insured lived in this
state he regularly mailed his premiums to the defendant's offices
in New York. The defendant was an unauthorized insurer and
apparently had no other contacts with this state. The plaintiff,
a resident, sued as beneficiary. The court held that it lacked
jurisdiction under the statute since the policy had not been
issued or delivered to a resident of this state.
In the following year, 19417, South Carolina adopted its In-
surance Code and the section was enlarged to provide jurisdic-
tion if the unauthorized insurer collects a premium from a resi-
dent of this state.89 Although now the statute would seem to
clearly cover the situation raised in Sanders, there is dicta in
a later case that this provision would not be given a literal inter-
pretation.40
Some courts have indicated that such an application of the
statute would be unconstitutional. 41 The Supreme Court has
held, in a case that did not involve insurance, that "in each case
there must be some act by which the defendant purposely avails
itself of the privileges of conducting activities within the forum
state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws,"42
and that the unilateral action of one party is not sufficient. The
fact that the insured mails premiums from the state would seem
at first glance, a matter over which the insurer could have no
control.43 If the insured resides in this state for any period of
time, however, the state should be able to acquire jurisdiction.
If the insurer is not willing to be sued in the state it can always
reject the premium payments or discontinue the policy. One
court has stated that the result of accepting such premiums is
precisely the same as that of agents personally collecting the
37. S.C. AcTs & J. &as. 1943, p. 211.
38. 208 S.C. 152, 37 S.E.2d 533 (1946).
39. S.C. AcTs & J. Ras. 1947, p. 355, S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-265 (1962).
40. Ross v. American Income Life Ins. Co., 232 S.C. 433, 102 S.E.2d 743
(1958).
41. Parmalee v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 206 F.2d 518 (5th Cir.
1953) ; Weinstein v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 206 Misc. 128, 134 N.Y.S.2d 207
(Sup. Ct. 1954).
42. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
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premiums instead of sending notices and receiving remittances
through the mails.4
McClanahan v. T'rans-Ameicea Ins. Co.45 provides a good
illustration of how injustice could have resulted from a narrow
interpretation of state jurisdiction. There, the insured purchased
an automobile liability policy from an Alabama insurer and
then moved to California where he resided for a short period
and was involved in an accident. The defendant insurer investi-
gated the claim and defended the suit. Losing the case, it left
the state and claimed lack of jurisdiction in the later suit by the
judgment creditor. Fortunately the court held that jurisdiction
had been acquired.
46
III. PARTIES EmITmu TO UsE TBM STATUTE
The South Carolina act states that it is available in any ac-
tions brought on behalf of the insured.47 It has been held in
this state that the insured 8 or a beneficiary 49 can use the statute.
Under a similar statute a New York court has, in a well reasoned
opinion, allowed its use by a judgment creditor. 0 There the
court said that there were no constitutional objections but rather
the question was one of statutory construction. The court con-
cluded that the general import of the statute was to protect New
York residents on obligations voluntarily assumed by the insurer.
This required the inclusion rather than the elimination of the
judgment creditor as a permissible suitor, since he is a "bene-
ficiary" of the policy. In other cases this use has been allowed
44. Schutt v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 229 F2d 158, 159 (2d
Cir. 1956).
45. 307 P2d 1023 (Cal. App. 1957).
46. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. M/V John E. Coon, 207 F. Supp. 45
(E.D. La. 1962) allowed application of the statute where the only contact
with the state was the occurrence of an accident there. The case of Canadian
Indem. Co. v. State Auto. Ins. Ass'n, 126 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Cal. 1954)
presents perhaps the most extreme attempt to use the statute. There a non
resident insurer of a California resident attempted to use the statute against
an Iowa insurer of an Iowa corporation, both of which were not authorized
to do business in California, by showing that the corporation was actually
doing business there. It failed.
47. S.C. CoDE ANx. § 37-265 (1962).
48. Ross v. American Income Life Ins. Co., 232 S.C. 433, 102 S.E2d 743
(1958).
49. Storey v. United Ins. Co., 64 F. Supp. 896 (E.D.S.C. 1946). The plain-
tiff probably would not be considered an "insured" or "beneficiary" of a policy
reinsuring the unauthorized insurer. See Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Stuyvesant
Ins. Co., 211 F. Supp. 227 (M.D.N.C. 1962); but see Food Fair Stores v.
General Excess Ins. Co., 21 App. Div. 2d 684, 250 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964).
50. Kaye v. Doe, 204 Misc. 719, 125 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
1965] NTES
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without discussion.5 1 Where the plaintiff is only a general
creditor and has not acquired any matured claims against the
insured, he is not considered a "beneficiary" under such a
statute.5 2
The act cannot be used by a person who is not an insured,
beneficiary or judgment creditor. The acts of the insurer suffi-
cient to bestow jurisdiction under the statute may not be suffi-
cient to allow suit by a person who is not covered. Rosenberg v.
Andrew Veir Ins. 0o01 involved an action by a claims agent on
a contract for claims services. He argued that the contacts with
the state were such that the insured under the particular policy
could clearly have maintained an action. The court held that
the same minimum acts do not necessarily constitute "doing
business" in the state for the purposes of a different type suit.
The suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The South Carolina statute speaks only of issuance and deliv-
ery of a policy to a "person."5 4 It does not refer to a corporation.
A later section allows the insurer to appear specially to set aside
service on several grounds.Y' One of these is that it has not
issued a policy to a corporation licensed to do business in this
state. In spite of the apparent inconsistency, a corporation
should be considered within the terms of the act.
If a corporation is domiciled in the state and its principal
place of business is there, little difficulty is seen in allowing the
maintenance of a suit by it. 56 It has been held that where the
policy was actually delivered in a state, a corporation domesti-
cated in that state could maintain a suit.
57
Where the corporation does business in many states, however,
a line must be drawn. Otherwise the corporation could pick
the most advantageous forum and bring its suit there. Where
such an attempt at "forum shopping" has apparently occurred
the courts have held that the suit could not be maintained.58
51. E.g., Polglase v. Illinois Nat'1 Ins. Co., 183 F. Supp. 519 (N.D. Cal.
1960).
52. Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 26 F.R.D. 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
53. 154 F. Supp. 6 (D. Md. 1957).
54. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-265 (1962).
55. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-270 (1962).
56. Of course a domestic corporation cannot bring suit under the statute as
assignee of a foreign corporation which is not authorized to do business in the
state. Food Fair Stores v. General Excess Ins. Co., 21 App. Div. 2d 684, 250
N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964).
57. Aero Associates, Ins. v. La Metropolitana Compania, 183 F. Supp. 357
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
58. E.g., Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 211 F. Supp. 227
(M.D.N.C. 1962); Clifton Products, Inc. v. American Universal Ins. Co., 169
F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
[Vol. 17
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IV. PmussmLE AcTIoxs
The statute is normally applied where there is a valid contract
and, after the loss has occurred, suit is brought to enforce it.
South Carolina, in addition, has construed the statute to cover
any action arising out of a contract of insurance.59 The action
may be either in contract or tort and punitive damages are
allowable even if the total amount of the suit is more than the
face value of the policy. The only qualification is that the action
must not be one which, by its nature, denies the issuance of a
valid contract. For example, while an action may be brought for
fraudulent breach of contract, there is no right of action for
fraud and deceit in inducing the purchase.60
The act relates only to service of process. It does not confer
on the plaintiff the procedural benefits of the state and federal
courts. In Lawson v. C reely61 the court said the act was in-
tended for service of process only and held that the plaintiff
could not, under the act, compel the insurer to obey a subpoena
commanding the production of an original insurance policy.
V. Tmi UwAumoRmED Isum -DEFNSES AND HADWSEUPS
An unauthorized insurer can expressly assert lack of jurisdic-
tion on the basis that no contract of insurance has been issued;
that it is not transacting business in this state; or, that service
has been made on an improper person.
62
In addition it has been held that the insurer is protected if the
person selling the policy had no apparent authority to do so.0 8
A more difficult question is presented where an agent sells the
policy outside of his allotted territory and without the knowledge
of the insurer that the policy was issued in the particular state.
At least one court has allowed the insurer to successfully defend
a subsequent action by the policy holder in this situation on the
basis of lack of jurisdiction.6 4
Aside from these defenses, the unauthorized insurer is under
extreme hardship in conducting any defense. It has no right to
59. Ross v. American Income Life Ins. Co., 232 S.C. 433, 102 S.E.2d 743
(1958).
60. Ibid.
61. 268 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. App. 1954).
62. S.C. CoDE ANx. § 37-270 (1962).
63. Atex Mfg. Co. v. "Lloyds of London", 139 F. Supp. 314 (W.D. Ark.
1955).
64. Wash v. Western Empire Life Ins. Co., 298 F.2d 374 (8th Cir. 1962).
19651. 'NOTES
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file any pleading without posting a bond or obtaining a license
to do business. It also is not allowed to have any agent in the
state to adjust or investigate the loss, unless the property or
person was insured in a state other than the one where loss
occurred and written authority is obtained from the commis-
sioner of insurance.65
Also, while the policy issued is valid and binding on the in-
surer, the courts of the state are closed to it on any suit arising
out of the contract until the unauthorized insurer procures a
license to do business in the state.6 In any action by a foreign
insurer, an affidavit by the insurer's counsel that the insurer is
not doing business in the state is not controlling.6 7
VI. Tnm BONDn G PIovIsIow
The most onerous section of the act for the unauthorized in-
surer is the bonding provision. Before the insurer can file a
pleading in an action against it a bond must be posted in an
amount fixed by the court sufficient to satisfy any final judg-
ment, even though the suit is for more than the amount of the
policy. In the alternative it can procure a license to do business
in this state.6 8 Often this is not a realistic choice since the
insurer may not be able to obtain a license.
While this imposes a hardship on the insurer, it is vitally
necessary for the protection of the plaintiff. Normally the
unauthorized insurer will have little, if any, property in the
state, and even though the plaintiff obtains a judgment, he
will be forced to go into the insurer's home state for enforcement
purposes. This, at best, will require added time and expense.
The greatest problem, however, is that since the money judg-
ment of one state cannot be the basis for collection in another6"
the insured who obtains a judgment in his home state would be
forced to enter the courts of the insurer's state and obtain a
second judgment based upon the first. In this second action the
65. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-264 (1962). See also general exemptions included
in this section.
66. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-267 (1962). Those insurers which issued policies
at a time when authorized are exempted from this section.
67. Empire Mut. Ins. Co. v. International Tram-Po-Line Mfrs. Inc., 39
Misc. 2d 810, 242 N.Y.S.2d 28 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
68. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-268 (1962).
69. Paulson, Enforcing the Money Judgment of a Sister State, 42 IowA L.
REV. 202 (1957) ; for a good discussion of this whole area see Dean, The For-
eign Unauthorized Insurer: A State Regulatory Gap July 1965 INS. COUNSELJ. 432, 440.42.
[Vol. 17
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insurer can raise additional defenses that the plaintiff will be
forced to overcome.70 There is the possibility that in the succeed-
ing litigations a deserving plaintiff may find himself precluded
from a remedy on procedural technicalities.
7'1
Even though a bond is required, the amount is left to the dis-
cretion of the court.7 2 This means that it could be for less than
the value of the policy or even less than the amount of the suit.
In one New York case, the bond was set at 8,000 dollars although
the total value of the policy was 100,000 dollars.7 3
By obtaining a court order requiring a bond, a plaintiff can
materially aid his case in certain situations since this provides
a financial hindrance to the insurer. In VeArs v. Jefferson Ins.
Co.,74 the defendant insurer, then in precarious financial straits,
rather than post the bond, elected to suffer a default judgment.
Once the bond is posted it may be held to be in trust to satisfy
any judgment obtained even though prior to the judgment, the
insurer is dissolved or becomes bankrupt.75 On the other hand,
if the plaintiff had sued in the insurer's home state he might
well be only a general creditor.
The important caveat to be remembered by the plaintiff, is
that the act was primarily intended for service of process; there-
fore, if jurisdiction is obtained without use of the act, the bond-
ing provision should be unavailable to the plaintiff.
7 6
VII. CONCLUSION
Section 2(b) of the McCarren-Ferguson Act provides that
"(T)he Federal Trade Commission Act,... shall be applicable
to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is
not regulated by state law." 77
70. These may be lack of jurisdiction, lack of finality, the running of the
statute of limitations and the payment or discharge in bankruptcy. Paulson,
supra note 69, at 204.
71. Dean, supra note 69, at 441.
72. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-268 (1962).
73. Kraus v. Monticello Ins. Co., 160 N.Y.S2d 27 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
74. 168 So. 2d 873 (La. App. 1964).
75. Dean Const. Co. v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 22 App. Div. 82, 254 N.Y.S.2d
196 (1964). South Carolina has held that the bond deposited by an authorized
insurer can be retained after bankruptcy. Clark v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co.,
231 S.C. 167, 97 S.E.2d 498 (1957).
76. See Arnold Chait, Ltd. v. La Metropolitana, Compania, 207 N.Y.S.2d 22
(Sup. Ct. 1960).
77. 15 U.S.C. 1011 (1959).
1965] NOTES
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The Supreme Court in FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n 8T held
that where a mail order insurance company was not effectively
regulated by a state, that company's activities were subject to
federal surveillance through the regulative authority of the FTC.
Although an unauthorized insurers act can create hardships
for unauthorized insurers, it is a vitally necessary regulatory
measure for the states-without it a deserving plaintiff can be
left without an available remedy. In addition, the act is neces-
sary to protect the individual states' regulatory powers granted
by Congress.
JoHN J. McKAY
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